Partial-monitoring games constitute a mathematical framework for sequential decision making problems with imperfect feedback: The learner repeatedly chooses an action, the opponent responds with an outcome, and then the learner suffers a loss and receives a feedback signal, both of which are fixed functions of the action and the outcome. The goal of the learner is to minimize his total cumulative loss. We make progress towards the classification of these games based on their minimax expected regret. Namely, we classify almost all games with two outcomes and a finite number of actions: We show that their minimax expected regret is either zero, Θ(
Introduction
Partial-monitoring games constitute a mathematical framework for sequential decision making problems with imperfect feedback. They arise as a natural generalization of many sequential decision making problems with full or partial feedback such as learning with expert advice [2, 3, 4] , the multi-armed bandit problem [5, 6, 7] , label efficient prediction [8, 9] , dynamic pricing [10, 11] , the dark pool problem [12] , the apple tasting problem [13] , online convex optimization [14, 15] , online linear [16] and convex optimization with bandit feedback [17] .
A partial-monitoring game is a repeated game between two players: the learner and the opponent. In each round, the learner chooses an action and simultaneously the opponent chooses an outcome. Next, the learner receives a feedback signal and suffers a loss; however neither the loss nor the outcome are revealed to the learner. The feedback and the loss are fixed functions of the action and the outcome, and these functions are known by both players. The main feature of this model is that it captures that the learner has imperfect or partial information about the outcome sequence. In this work, we make the natural assumption that the opponent is oblivious, that is, the opponent does not have access to the learner's actions.
The goal of the learner is to keep his cumulative loss small. However, since the opponent could choose the outcome sequence so that the learner suffers as high loss as possible, it is too much to ask for an absolute guarantee for the cumulative loss. Instead, a competitive viewpoint is taken and the cumulative loss of the learner is compared with the cumulative loss of the best among all the constant strategies, i.e., strategies that choose the same action in every round. The difference between the cumulative loss of the learner and the cumulative loss of the best constant strategy is called the regret.
Generally, the regret grows with the number of rounds of the game. If the growth is sublinear then the learner is said to be Hannan consistent 1 , and in the long run the learner's average loss per round approaches the average loss per round of the best action.
Designing learning algorithms with low regret is the main focus of study of partial-monitoring games. For a given game, the ultimate goal is to find out its optimal worst-case (minimax) regret, and design an algorithm that achieves it. The minimax regret can be viewed as an inherent measure of how hard the game is for the learner. The motivation behind this paper was the desire to determine the minimax regret and design an algorithm achieving it for each game in a large class.
In this paper we restrict our attention to games with a finite number of actions and two outcomes. This class is a subset of the class of finite partial-monitoring games, introduced by Piccolboni and Schindelhauer [19] , in which both the set of actions and the set of outcomes are finite.
Previous Results
For full-information games (i.e., when the feedback determines the outcome) with N actions and losses lying in the interval [0, 1], there exists a randomized algorithm with expected regret at most √ T ln(N)/2 where T is the time horizon (see e.g., Lugosi and Cesa-Bianchi [20, Chapter 4] and references therein). Furthermore, it is known that this upper bound is tight: There exist full-information games with losses lying in the interval [0, 1] for which the worst-case expected regret of any algorithm is at least Ω( √ T ln N) [20, Chapter 3] .
Another special case of partial-monitoring games is the multi-armed bandit game, where the learner's feedback is the loss of the action he chooses. For a multi-armed bandit game with N actions and losses lying in the interval [0, 1] , the INF algorithm [21] has expected regret at most O( √ T N). (The well-known Exp3 algorithm [5] achieves the bound O( T N log N).) It is also known that the bound O( √ T N) is optimal [5] . Piccolboni and Schindelhauer [19] introduced finite partial-monitoring games. They showed that, for any finite game, either there is a strategy for the learner that achieves regret of at most O(T 3/4 (ln T ) 1/2 ) or the worst-case expected regret of any learner is Ω(T ). Cesa-Bianchi et al. [22] improved this result and showed that Piccolboni and Schindelhauer's algorithm achieves O(T 2/3 ) regret. They also gave an example of a game with worst-case expected regret at least Ω(T 2/3 ). More recently, Lugosi et al. [23] designed algorithms and proved upper bounds in a slightly different setting, where the feedback signal is a possibly noisy function of the outcome or both the action and the outcome.
However, from these results it is unclear what determines which games have minimax regret Θ( √ T ), which games have minimax regret Θ(T 2/3 ) and whether there exist finite games with minimax regret not belonging to either of these categories. Cesa-Bianchi et al. [22] note that: "It remains a challenging problem to characterize the class of problems that admit rates of convergence faster than O(n −1/3 )." 2 
Our Results
We classify the minimax expected regret of finite partial-monitoring games with two outcomes. From our classification we exclude certain "degenerate games"; their precise definition is given later in the paper. We show that the minimax regret of any non-degenerate game falls into one of the four categories: 0, Θ( √ T ), Θ(T 2/3 ), Θ(T ) and no other option is possible 3 . We call the four classes of games trivial, easy, hard, and hopeless, respectively. We give a simple and efficiently computable geometric characterization of these four classes.
Additionally, we show that each of the four classes admits a computationally efficient learning algorithm achieving the minimax expected regret, up to logarithmic factors. In particular, we design an efficient learning algorithm for easy games with expected regret at most O( √ T ). For hard games, the algorithm of Cesa-Bianchi et al. [22] has O(T 2/3 ) regret. For trivial games, a simple algorithm that chooses the same action in every round has zero regret. For hopeless games, any algorithm has Θ(T ) regret.
Basic Definitions and Notations
A finite partial-monitoring game is specified by a pair of N × M matrices (L, H) where N is the number of actions, M is the number of outcomes, L is the loss matrix, and H is the feedback matrix. We use the notation n = {1, . . . , n} for any integer and denote the actions and outcomes by integers starting from 1, so the action set is N and the outcome set is M. We denote by i, j and h i, j (i ∈ N, j ∈ M) the entries of L and H, respectively. We denote by i the i-th row (i ∈ N) of L, and we call it the loss vector of action i. The elements of L are arbitrary real numbers. The elements of H belong to some alphabet Σ, we only assume that the learner is able to distinguish two different elements of the alphabet. We often use the set of natural or real numbers as the alphabet.
The matrices L, H are known by both the learner and the opponent. The game proceeds in T rounds. In each round t = 1, 2, . . . , T , the learner chooses an action I t ∈ N and simultaneously the opponent chooses an outcome J t ∈ M, then the learner receives the feedback h I t ,J t . Nothing else is revealed to the learner; in particular J t and the loss I t ,J t remain hidden.
In principle, both I t and J t can be chosen randomly. However, to simplify our treatment, we assume that the opponent is deterministic and oblivious to the actions of the learner. Equivalently, we can assume that the sequence of outcomes J 1 , J 2 , . . . , J T is a fixed deterministic sequence chosen before the first round of the game. On the other hand, it is important to allow the learner to choose his actions I t randomly. A randomized strategy (algorithm) A of the learner is a sequence of random functions I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I T where each of the functions maps the feedback from the past outcomes (and learner's internal random "bits") to an action; formally I t :
The learner is scored according to the loss matrix. In each round t, the learner incurs instantaneous loss I t ,J t . The goal of the learner is to keep his cumulative loss T t=1 I t ,J t small. The (cumulative) regret of an algorithm A is defined as
In other words, the regret is the excess loss of the learner compared to the loss of the best constant action. We denote by
where the supremum is taken over all outcome sequences J 1:T = (J 1 , J 2 , . . . , J T ) ∈ M T . The minimax expected regret of G (or minimax regret, for short) is:
where the infimum is taken over all randomized strategies A. Note that, since R T (A, G) ≥ 0 for constant outcome sequences, R T (G) ≥ 0 also holds.
We identify the set of all probability distributions over the set of outcomes M with the probability simplex
We use ·, · to denote the standard dot product.
Characterization of Games with Two Outcomes
In this section, we formally phrase our main characterization result. We need a preliminary definition that is useful for any finite game:
Definition 1 (Properties of Actions). Let G = (L, H) be a finite partial-monitoring game with N actions and M outcomes. Let i ∈ N be one of its actions.
• Action i is called dominated if for any p ∈ ∆ M there exists an action i such that i i and i , p ≤ i , p .
• Action i is called non-dominated if it is not dominated.
• Action i is called degenerate if it is dominated and there exists a distribution p ∈ ∆ M such that for all i ∈ N, i , p ≤ i , p .
• Action i is called all-revealing if any pair of outcomes j, j , j j satisfies h i, j h i, j .
• Action i is called none-revealing if any pair of outcomes j, j satisfies h i, j = h i, j .
• Action i is called partially-revealing if it is neither all-revealing nor none-revealing.
• All-revealing and partially-revealing actions together are called revealing actions.
• Two or more actions with the same loss vector are called duplicate actions.
The property of being dominated has an equivalent dual definition. Namely, action i is dominated if there exists a set of actions with loss vectors not equal to i such that some convex combination of their loss vectors is componentwise upper bounded by i .
In games with M = 2 outcomes, each action is either all-revealing or none-revealing. This dichotomy is one of the key properties that lead to the classification theorem for two-outcome games. To emphasize the dichotomy, from now on we will refer to them as revealing and non-revealing whenever it is clear from the context that M = 2.
The above property also allows us to assume without of loss generality that there are no duplicate actions. Clearly, if multiple actions with the same loss vector exist, all but one can be removed (together with the corresponding rows of L and H) without changing the minimax regret: If all of them are nonrevealing, we keep one of the actions and remove all the others. Otherwise, we keep a revealing action and remove the others. Then replacing any algorithm by one that, instead of a removed action, chooses always the corresponding kept action, its loss cannot increase and equals to the loss of this algorithm for the original game. So the two games have the same minimax regret.
The concepts of dominated and non-dominated actions can be visualized for two-outcome games by drawing the loss vector of each action as a point in R 2 . The points corresponding to the non-dominated actions lie on the bottom-left boundary of the convex hull of the set of all the actions, as shown in Figure 1 . Enumerating the non-dominated actions ordered according to their loss for the first outcome gives rise to a sequence (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i K ), which we call the chain of non-dominated actions.
To state the classification theorem, we introduce the following conditions. Separation Condition. A two-outcome game G satisfies the separation condition if, after removing duplicate actions, its chain of non-dominated actions does not have a pair of consecutive actions i k , i k+1 such that both of them are non-revealing. The set of games satisfying this condition will be denoted by S.
Non-degeneracy Condition. A two-outcome game G is degenerate if it has a degenerate revealing action. If G is not degenerate, we call it non-degenerate and we say that it satisfies the non-degeneracy condition.
As we will soon see, the separation condition is the key to distinguish between hard and easy games. On the other hand, the non-degeneracy condition is merely a technical condition that we need in our proofs. The set of degenerate games is excluded from the characterization, as we do not know the minimax regret of these games. We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 2 (Classification of Two-Outcome Partial-Monitoring Games). Let S be the set of all finite partialmonitoring games with two outcomes that satisfy the separation condition. Let G = (L, H) be a game with two outcomes that satisfies the non-degeneracy condition. Let K be the number of non-dominated actions in G, counting duplicate actions only once. The minimax expected regret R T (G) satisfies
We call the games in cases (1a)-(1d) trivial, easy, hard, and hopeless, respectively. Case (1a) is proven by the following lemma which shows that a trivial game is also characterized by having 0 minimax regret in a single round or by having an action "dominating" alone all the others: Lemma 3. For any finite partial-monitoring game, the following four statements are equivalent:
a) The minimax regret is zero for each T . b) The minimax regret is zero for some T . c) There exists a (non-dominated) action i ∈ N whose loss is not larger than the loss of any other action irrespectively of the choice of Nature's action. d) The game is trivial, i.e., K = 1 (using the definition in Theorem 2).
The proof of this lemma can be found in the Appendix. Case (1d) of Theorem 2 is proven in the Appendix as well. The upper bound of case (1c) can be derived from a result of Cesa-Bianchi et al. [22] : Recall that the entries of H can be changed without changing the information revealed to the learner as long as one does not change the pattern of which elements in a row are equal and different. Cesa-Bianchi et al. [22] show that if the entries of H can be chosen such that rank(H) = rank H L then O(T 2/3 ) expected regret is achievable. This condition holds trivially for two-outcome games with at least one revealing action and N ≥ 2. It remains to prove the upper bound for case (1b), the lower bound for (1b), and the lower bound for (1c); we prove these in Sections 5, 6, and 7, respectively.
Examples
Before we dive into the proof of Theorem 2, we give a few examples of finite partial-monitoring games with two outcomes and show how the theorem can be applied. For each example we present the matrices L, H and depict the loss vectors of actions as points in R 2 .
Example 4 (One-Armed Bandit). We start with an example of a multi-armed bandit game. Multi-armed bandit games are those where the feedback equals the instantaneous loss, that is, when L = H. 4 4 "Classically", non-stochastic multi-armed bandit problems are defined by the restriction that in no round Learner can gain any information about the losses of actions other than the chosen one, that is, L is not known in advance to Learner. (Also, the domain set of losses is often infinite there (M = ∞).) When H = L in our setting, depending on L, this might or might not be the case; the "classical bandit" problem with losses constrained to a finite set is a special case of games with H = L, however, the latter condition allows also other types of games where the Learner can recover the losses of actions not chosen, and so which could be "easier" than classical bandits due to the knowledge of L. Nevertheless, it is easy to see that these games are at most as hard as classical bandit games.
Revealing non-dominated action Non-revealing non-dominated action
Because the loss of the first action is 0 regardless of the outcome, and the loss varies only for the second action, we call this game a one-armed bandit game. Both actions are non-dominated and the second one is revealing, therefore it is an easy game and according to Theorem 2 its minimax regret is Θ( √ T ). (For this specific game, it can be shown that it is in fact Θ(
Example 5 (Apple Tasting). Consider an orchard that wants to hand out its crop of apples for sale. However, some of the apples might be rotten. The orchard can do a sequential test. Each apple can be either tasted (which reveals whether the apple is healthy or rotten) or the apple can be given out for sale. If a rotten apple is given out for sale, the orchard suffers a unit loss. On the other hand, if a healthy apple is tasted, it cannot be sold and, again, the orchard suffers a unit loss. This can be formalized by the following partial-monitoring game [13] :
Revealing non-dominated action
Non-revealing non-dominated action
The first action corresponds to giving out the apple for sale, the second corresponds to tasting the apple; the first outcome corresponds to a rotten apple, the second outcome corresponds to a healthy apple. Both actions are non-dominated and the second one is revealing, therefore it is an easy game and according to Theorem 2 the minimax regret is Θ(
. This is apparently a new result for this game. Also notice that the picture is a just a translation of the picture for the one-armed bandit.
Example 6 (Label Efficient Prediction).
Consider a situation when we would like to sequentially classify emails as spam or as legitimate. For each email we have to output a prediction, and additionally we can request, as feedback, the correct label from the user. If we classify an email incorrectly or we request its label, we suffer a unit loss. (If the email is classified correctly and we do not request the feedback, no loss is suffered.) This can be formalized by the following partial-monitoring game [22] :
Non-revealing non-dominated action Revealing dominated action where the first action corresponds to a label request, and the second and the third action correspond to a prediction (spam and legitimate, respectively) without a request. The outcomes correspond to spam and legitimate emails.
We see that the chain of non-dominated actions contains two neighboring non-revealing actions and there is a dominated revealing action. Therefore, it is a hard game and, by Theorem 2, the minimax regret is Θ(T 2/3 ). This specific example was the only game known so far with minimax regret at least Ω(T 2/3 ) [22, Theorem 5.1].
Example 7 (A Hopeless Game). The following game is an example where the feedback does not reveal any information about the outcome:
Non-revealing non-dominated action
Because both actions are non-revealing and non-dominated, it is a hopeless game and thus its minimax regret is Θ(T ).
Example 8 (A Trivial Game).
In the following game, the best action, regardless of the outcome sequence, is action 2. A learner that chooses this action in every round is guaranteed to have zero regret.
Revealing dominated action
Because this game has only one non-dominated action (action 2), it is a trivial game and thus its minimax regret is 0.
Example 9 (A Degenerate Game). The next game does not satisfy the non-degeneracy condition and therefore Theorem 2 does not apply.
Non-revealing non-dominated action Revealing dominated (degenerate) action
Its minimax regret is between Ω(
It remains an open problem to close this gap and determine the exact rate of growth.
Upper bound for easy games
In this section we present our algorithm for games satisfying the separation condition and the non-degeneracy condition, and prove that it achieves O( √ T ) regret with high probability. We call the algorithm AppleTree since it builds a binary tree, leaves of which are apple tasting games.
The algorithm
In the first step of the algorithm we can purify the game by first removing the dominated actions and then the duplicates as mentioned beforehand.
The idea of the algorithm is to recursively split the game until we arrive at games with two actions only. Now, if one has only two actions in a partial-information game, the game must be either a full-information game (if both actions are revealing) or an instance of a one-armed bandit (with one revealing and one non-revealing action).
To see why this latter case corresponds to one-armed bandits, assume without loss of generality that the first action is the revealing action. Now, it is easy to see that the regret of a sequence of actions in a game does not change if the loss matrix is changed by subtracting the same number from a column. 5 By subtracting 2,1 from the first and 2,2 from the second column we thus get the equivalent game where the second row of the loss matrix is zero, arriving at a one-armed bandit game (see Example 4) . Since a onearmed bandit is a special form of a two-armed bandit, one can use Exp3.P due to Auer et al. [5] to achieve the O( √ T ) regret. Now, if there are more than two actions in the game, then the game is split, putting the first half of the actions into the first and the second half into the second subgame, with a single common shared action. Recall that, in the chain of non-dominated actions, the actions are ordered according to their losses corresponding to the first outcome. This is continued until the split results in games with two actions only. The recursive splitting of the game results in a binary tree (see Figure 2 ). The idea of the strategy played at an internal node of the tree is as follows: An outcome sequence of length T determines the frequency ρ T of outcome 2. If this frequency is small, the optimal action is one of the actions of G 1 , the first subgame (simply because then the frequency of outcome 1 is high and G 1 contains the actions with the smallest loss for the first outcome). Conversely, if this frequency is large, the optimal action is one of the actions of G 2 . In some intermediate range, the optimal action is the action shared between the subgames. Let the boundaries of this range be ρ
, where s = K/2 is the index of the action shared between the two subgames.)
If we knew ρ T , a good solution would be to play a strategy where the actions are restricted to that of either game G 1 or G 2 , depending on whether
it does not matter which action-set we restrict the play to, since the optimal action in this case is included in both sets.) There are two difficulties. First, since the outcome sequence is not known in advance, the best we can hope for is to know the running frequencies Nevertheless, for now let us assume that ρ t was available. Then one idea would be to play a strategy restricted to the actions of either game G 1 or G 2 as long as ρ t stays below ρ * 1 or above ρ * 2 . Further, when ρ t becomes larger than ρ * 2 while previously the strategy played the action of G 1 then we have to switch to the game G 2 . In this case, we start a fresh copy (a reset) of a strategy playing in G 2 . The same happens when a switch from G 2 to game G 1 is necessary. These resets are necessary because at the leaves we play according to strategies that use weights that depend on the cumulated losses of the actions exponentially. To see an example when without resets the algorithm fails to achieve a small regret consider the case when there are 3 actions, the middle one being revealing. Assume that during the first T/2 time steps the frequency of outcome 2 oscillates between the two boundaries so that the algorithm switches constantly back and forth between the games G 1 and G 2 . Assume further that in the second half of the game, the outcome is always 2. This way the optimal action will be 3. Nevertheless, up to time step T/2, the player of G 2 will only see outcome 1 and thus will think that action 2 is the optimal action. In the second half of the game, he will not have enough time to recover and will play action 2 for too long. Resetting the algorithms of the subgames avoids this behavior.
If the number of switches was large, the repeated resetting of the strategies could be equally problematic. Luckily this cannot happen, hence the resetting does minimal harm. We will in fact show that this generalizes to the case even when ρ t is estimated based on partial feedback (see Lemma 11) .
Let us now turn to how ρ t is estimated. As mentioned in Section 3, mapping a row of H bijectively leads to an equivalent game, thus for M = 2 we can assume without loss of generality that in any round, the algorithm receives (possibly random) feedback H t ∈ {1, 2, * }: if a revealing action is played in the round,
history of actions and observations up to time step t − 1. If the algorithm choosing the actions decides with probability p t ∈ (0, 1] to play a revealing action (p t can depend on H 1:t−1 ) then I (H t = 2) /p t is a simple unbiased estimate of I (J t = 2) (in fact, E I (H t = 2) /p t |H 1:t−1 = I (J t = 2)). As long as p t does not drop to a too low value,ρ t = 1 t t s=1
will be a relatively reliable estimate of ρ t (see Lemma 12) . However reliable this estimate is, it can still differ from ρ t . For this reason, we push the boundaries determining game switches towards each other:
We call the resulting algorithm AppleTree, because the elementary partial-information 2-action games in the bottom essentially correspond to instances of the apple tasting problem (see Example 5) . The algo-
Play(root) 5 : end for 
if not IsRevealing(G, 1) then
G ← SwapActions(G) 4: end if 5:
InitEta(G, T ) 9: else 10:
BuildTree(Child(v, 2), G 2 , δ/(4T ) ) 13 : rithm's main entry point is shown on Figure 3 . Its inputs are the game G = (L, H), the time horizon and a confidence parameter 0 < δ < 1. The algorithm first eliminates the dominated and duplicate actions. This is followed by building a tree, which is used to store variables necessary to play in the subgames ( Figure 5 ): If the number of actions is 2, the procedure initializes various parameters that are used either by a bandit algorithm (based on Exp3.P [5] ), or by the exponentially weighted average algorithm (EWA) [4] . In the other case, it calls itself recursively on the split subgames and with an appropriately decreased confidence parameter.
The main worker routine is called Play. This is again a recursive function (see Figure 6 ). The special case when the number of actions is two is handled in routine PlayAtLeaf, which will be discussed later. When the number of actions is larger, the algorithm recurses to play in the subgame that was remembered as the game to be preferred from the last round and then updates its estimate of the frequency of outcome 2 based on the information received. When this estimate changes so that a switch of the current preferred game is necessary, the algorithm resets the algorithms in the subtree corresponding to the game switched to, and changes the variable storing the index of the preferred game. The Reset function used for this purpose, shown on Figure 7 , is also recursive.
At the leaves, when there are only two actions, either EWA or Exp3.P is used. These algorithms are used with their standard optimized parameters (see Corollary 4.2 for the tuning of EWA, and Theorem 6.10 for the tuning of Exp3.P, both from the book of Lugosi and Cesa-Bianchi [20] ). For completeness, their pseudocodes are shown in Figures 8-9 . Note that with Exp3.P (lines 6-14) we use the loss matrix transformation described earlier, hence the loss matrix has zero entries for the second (non-revealing) action, while the entry for action 1 and outcome j is 1, j (v) − 2, j (v). Here i, j (v) stands for the loss of action i and outcome j in the game G(v) that is stored at node v. 
Reset(Child(v, 1)); g(v) ← 1 8:
Reset(Child(v, 2)); g(v) 
Reset(Child(v, 1)) 6: end if 
Throughout the proof we will analyze the algorithm's behavior at the root node. We will use time indices as follows. Let us define the filtration {F t = σ(I 1 , . . . , I t )} t , where I t is the action the algorithm plays at time step t. To any variable x(v) used by the algorithm, we denote by x t (v) the value of x(v) that is measurable with respect to F t , but not measurable with respect to F t−1 . From now on we abbreviate x t (root) by x t . We start with two lemmas. The first lemma shows that the number of switches the algorithm makes is small. Note that here we use the non-degeneracy condition to ensure that ∆ > 0.
Proof. Let s be the number of times the algorithm switches from G 2 to G 1 . Let t 1 < · · · < t s be the time steps whenρ t becomes smaller than ρ 1 . Similarly, let t 1 < · · · < t s+ξ , (ξ ∈ {0, 1}) be the time steps whenρ t becomes greater than ρ 2 . Note that for all 1 ≤ j < s, t j < t j < t j+1 . Finally, for every 1 ≤ j < s, we define t j = min{t | t j ≤ t ≤ t j , (∀t ≤ τ ≤ t j :ρ τ ≤ 1)}. In other words, t j is the time step whenρ t drops below 1 and stays there until the next reset.
First we observe that if t j ≥ 2/∆ thenρ t j ≥ (ρ 1 + ρ 2 )/2. Indeed, if t j = t j thenρ t j ≥ ρ 2 , on the other hand, if t j t j thenρ t j −1 > 1 and, from the update rule we havê
(p, h) ← Ewa(v) 3: else Partial-information case 4:
if U < p then Play revealing action 7: h ← CHOOSE(1) h ∈ {1, 2} 8:
10:
11:
12:
h ← CHOOSE (2) here h = * The number of times the algorithm resets is at most 2s + 1. Let j * be the first index such that t j * ≥ 2/∆. For any j * ≤ j ≤ s,ρ t j ≥ (ρ 1 + ρ 2 )/2 andρ t j ≤ ρ 1 . According to the update rule we have for any t j < t ≤ t j thatρ
Summing this inequality for all t j + 1 ≤ t ≤ t j such that j ≥ j * we get
Thus, there exists c > 0 such that for all j * ≤ j ≤ s
Adding (3) for j * < j ≤ s we get (s − j * )
We conclude the proof with observing that j * ≤ 2/∆.
The next lemma shows that the estimate of the relative frequency of outcome 2 is not far away from its true value.
Lemma 12. For any 0 < δ < 1, with probability at least 1 − δ, for all t ≥ 8
The proof of the lemma employs Bernstein's inequality for martingales.
Bernstein's inequality for martingales. [20, Lemma A.8] Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n be a bounded martingale difference sequence with respect to a filtration {F } n i=0 and with |X i | ≤ K. Let
be the associated martingale. Denote the sum of conditional variances by
Then, for all constants , v > 0,
Proof of Lemma 12. For 1 ≤ t ≤ T , let p t be the conditional probability of playing a revealing action at time step t, given the history H 1:t−1 . Recall that, due to the construction of the algorithm, p t ≥ 1/ √ T . If we writeρ t in its explicit formρ t = 1 t t s=1
is an unbiased estimate of the relative frequency. Let us define random variables X s :=
Since p s is determined by the history, {X s } s is a martingale difference sequence. Also, from p s ≥ 1/ √ T we know that Var(X s |H 1:t−1 ) ≤ √ T . Hence, we can use Bernstein's inequality for martingales with = ∆t,
We have that if t ≥ 8
We get the bound for all t ∈ [8
, T ] using the union bound.
Proof of Theorem 10. To prove that the algorithm achieves the desired regret bound we use induction on the depth of the tree, d. If d = 1, AppleTree plays either EWA or Exp3.P. EWA is known to satisfy Theorem 10, and, as we discussed earlier, Exp3.P achieves O( √ T ln T/δ) regret as well. As the induction hypothesis we assume that Theorem 10 is true for any T and any game such that the tree built by the algorithm has depth d < d.
Let Q 1 = {1, . . . , K/2 }, Q 2 = { K/2 , . . . , K} be the sets of actions associated with the subgames in the root. (Recall that the actions are ordered with respect to ·,1 .) Furthermore, let us define the following values: Let T 0 0 = 1, let T 0 i be the first time step t after T 0 i−1 such that g t g t−1 . In other words, T 0 i are the time steps when the algorithm switches between the subgames. Finally, let T i = min(T 0 i , T + 1). From Lemma 11 we know that T S max +1 = T + 1, where S max = c * ln T ∆ . It is easy to see that T i are stopping times for any i ≥ 1.
Without loss of generality, from now on we will assume that the optimal action i * ∈ Q 1 . If i * = K/2 then, since it is contained in both subgames, the bound trivially follows from the induction hypothesis and Lemma 11. In the rest of the proof we assume i * < K/2.
Let S = max{i ≥ 1 | T 0 i ≤ T } be the number of switches, c = 8 3∆ 2 , and B be the event that for all t ≥ c √ T ln(4T/δ), |ρ t − ρ t | ≤ ∆. We know from Lemma 12 that Pr[B] ≥ 1 − δ/2. On B we have that |ρ T − ρ T | ≤ ∆, and thus, using that i * < K/2, ρ T ≤ ρ * 1 . This implies that in the last phase the algorithm plays on G 1 . It is also easy to see that before the last switch, at time step T S − 1,ρ is between ρ * 1 and ρ * 2 , if T S is large enough. Thus, up to time step T S − 1, the optimal action is K/2 , the one that is shared by the two subgames. This implies that
Thus, we have
where π(r) is 1 if r is odd and 2 if r is even. Note that for the last line of the above inequality chain to be well defined, we need outcome sequences of length at most 2T . It does us no harm to assume that for all T < t ≤ 2T , say, J t = 1.
Recall that the strategies that play in the subgames are reset after the switches. Hence, the sum R I t ,J t − i,J t is the regret of the algorithm if it is used in the subgame G π(r) for m ≤ T steps. Then, exploiting that T r are stopping times, we can use the induction hypothesis to bound R (r) m . In particular, let C be the event that for all m ≤ T the sum is less than c √ T ln p (2T 2 /δ). Since the root node calls its children with confidence parameter δ/(2T ), we have that Pr[C c ] ≤ δ/2. In summary, Remark The above theorem proves a high probability bound on the regret. We can get a bound on the expected regret if we set δ to 1/ √ T . Also note that the bound given by the induction grows in the number of non-dominated actions as O(K log 2 K ).
Lower Bound for Non-Trivial Games
In the following sections, · 1 and · denote the L 1 -and L 2 -norm of a vector in a Euclidean space, respectively.
In this section, we show that non-trivial games have minimax regret at least Ω( √ T ). We state and prove this result for all finite games, in contrast to earlier related lower bounds which apply to specific losses (see Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [20, Theorems 3.7, 6.3, 6.4, 6.11] for full-information, label efficient, and bandit games).
Theorem 13 (Lower bound for non-trivial games). If G = (L, H) is a finite non-trivial (K ≥ 2) partialmonitoring game then there exists a constant c > 0 such that for any T ≥ 1 the minimax expected regret
The proof presented below works for stochastic nature, as well. There is a far simpler proof in the Appendix, however, that one applies only for adversarial nature.
Recall that ∆ M ⊂ R M is the (M − 1)-dimensional probability simplex. For the proof, we start with a geometrical lemma, which ensures the existence of a pair i 1 ,i 2 of nondominated actions that are "neighbors" in the sense that for any small enough > 0, there exists a pair of " -close" outcome distributions p + v and p − v such that i 1 is uniquely optimal under the first distribution, and i 2 is uniquely optimal under the second distribution overtaking each non-optimal action by at least Ω( ) in both cases.
Lemma 14 ( -close distributions)
. Let G = (L, H) be any finite non-trivial game with N non-duplicate actions and M ≥ 2 outcomes. Then there exist two non-dominated actions i 1 ,i 2 ∈ N, p ∈ ∆ M , v ∈ R M \ {0}, and c,α > 0 satisfying the following properties: For any ∈ (0, α),
Proof of Lemma 14. For any action i ∈ N, consider the cell
in the probability simplex ∆ M . The cell C i corresponds to the set of outcome distributions under which action i is optimal. Each cell is the intersection of some closed half-spaces and ∆ M , and thus it is a compact convex polytope of dimension at most M − 1. Note that
For C ⊆ ∆ M , denote int C its interior in the topology induced by the hyperplane {x ∈ R M : (1, . . . , 1), x = 1} and rint C its relative interior 6 . Let λ be the (M − 1)-dimensional Lebesgue-measure. It is easy to see that for any pair of cells
Hence the cells form a cell-decomposition of the simplex. Any two cells C i and C i are separated by the hyperplane
The cells are characterized by the following lemma (which itself holds also with duplicate actions):
Hence there is three kind of "cells":
The proof is in the Appendix. The non-triviality of the game (K ≥ 2) means that there are at least two non-dominated actions of type 3 above. In the cell decomposition, due to Lemma 15, there must exist two such (M − 1)-dimensional cells C i 1 and C i 2 corresponding to two non-dominated actions i 1 ,i 2 , such that their intersection C i 1 ∩ C i 2 is an (M − 2)-dimensional polytope. Clearly, i 1 i 2 , since otherwise the cells would coincide; thus part (a) is satisfied.
Moreover, rint(C i 1 ∩ C i 2 ) ⊆ rint ∆ M since otherwise λ(C i 1 ) or λ(C i 2 ) would be zero. We can choose any p ∈ rint(C i 1 ∩ C i 2 ). This choice of p guarantees that p ∈ f i 1 ,i 2 , i 1 , p = i 2 , p , p ∈ rint ∆ M , and part (b) is satisfied. Since C i 1 ∩ C i 2 is (M − 2)-dimensional, it also implies that there exists δ > 0 such that the δ-neighborhood {q ∈ R M : p − q < δ} of p is contained in rint(C i 1 ∪ C i 2 ).
Since p ∈ f i 1 ,i 2 therefore the hyperplane of vectors satisfying (c) does not coincide with f i 1 ,i 2 implying that we can choose v ∈ R M \ {0} satisfying part (c), v < δ, and v f i 1 ,i 2 . We can assume
6 Relative interior of C ⊆ R M is its interior in the topology induced by the smallest affine space containing it.
(otherwise we choose −v). Since p±v lie in the δ-neighborhood of p, they lie in rint(C i 1 ∪C i 2 ). In particular,
The convexity of C i 1 and C i 2 implies that for any ∈ (0, 1], p 1 ∈ rint C i 1 and p 2 ∈ rint C i 2 . This, in particular, ensures that p 1 ,p 2 ∈ ∆ M and part (d) holds. To prove (e) define I = {i ∈ N : i is collinear with i 1 and i 2 }. We consider two cases: As the first case fix action i ∈ I \ {i 1 }, that is, i is an affine combination i = a i i 1 + b i i 2 for some a i + b i = 1. Since i 1 and i 2 are non-dominated, this must be a convex combination with a i ,b i ≥ 0. There is no duplicate action, thus (7) for any ≥ 0 (6) we know that b i i 2 − i 1 , v and so c are positive.
As the second case suppose i I. Then, the hyperplane f i 1 ,i does not coincide with
This means that if we choose 0 < c ≤ min(c , (7) we have again
is proved analogously to part (e), and by adjusting α and c if necessary.
We now continue with a technical lemma, which quantifies an upper bound on the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence (or relative entropy) between the two distributions from the previous lemma. Recall that the KL divergence between two probability distributions p,q ∈ ∆ M is defined as
Lemma 16 (KL divergence of -close distributions). Let p ∈ ∆ M be a probability vector. For any vector ε ∈ R M such that both p − ε and p + ε lie in ∆ M and |ε( j)| ≤ p( j)/2 for all j ∈ M, the KL divergence of p − ε and p + ε satisfies
for some constant c depending only on p.
Proof of Lemma 16. Since p, p+ε, and p−ε are all probability vectors, notice that the coordinates of ε have to sum up to zero. Also if a coordinate of p is zero then the corresponding coordinate of ε has to be zero as well. As zero coordinates do not modify the KL divergence, we can assume without loss of generality that all coordinates of p are positive. By definition,
We write the logarithmic factor as
We use the second order Taylor expansion ln(1 ± x) = ±x − x 2 /2 + O(|x| 3 ) around 0 to get that ln(1 − x) − ln(1 + x) = −2x + r(x), where r(x) is a remainder upper bounded for all |x| ≤ 1/2 as |r(x)| ≤ c |x| 3 with some universal constant c > 0. 7 Substituting
Here the first term is 0. Letting p = min j∈M p( j), the second term is bounded by 2 M j=1 ε 2 ( j)/p = (2/p) ε 2 , and the third term is bounded by
Hence,
Proof of Theorem 13. The proof is similar as in Auer et al. [5] . When M = 1, G is always trivial, thus we assume that M ≥ 2. Without loss of generality we may assume that all the actions are all-revealing. Then, as in Section 3 for M=2, we can also assume that there are no duplicate actions, thus for any two actions i and i , i i . Lemma 14 implies that there exist two actions i 1 ,i 2 , p ∈ ∆ M , v ∈ R M , and c 1 ,α > 0 satisfying conditions (a)-(f). To avoid cumbersome indexing, by renaming the actions we can achieve that i 1 = 1 and i 2 = 2. Let p 1 = p + v and p 2 = p − v for some ∈ (0, α). We determine the precise value of later. By Lemma 14
Fix any randomized learning algorithm A and time horizon T . We use randomization replacing the outcomes by a sequence J 1 , J 2 , . . . , J T of random variables i.i.d. according to p k , k ∈ {1, 2}, and independently of the internal randomization of A. Let
be the expected number of times action i is chosen by A under p k up to time step T . With subindex k, Pr k and E k denote probability and expectation given outcome model k ∈ {1, 2}, respectively.
Lemma 17. For any partial-monitoring game with N actions and M outcomes, algorithm A and outcome distribution p k ∈ ∆ M such that action k is optimal under p k , we havē
The proof is in the Appendix. Parts (e) and (f) of Lemma 14 imply that k , p k ≤ i , p k for k ∈ {1, 2} and any i ∈ N, henceR T (A, G) can be bounded in terms of N (k) i using Lemma 17. They also imply that for any i ∈ N if i k then i − k , p k ≥ c 1 . Therefore, we can continue lower bounding (9) as
Collecting (9) and (10), we see that the worst-case regret of A is lower bounded bȳ
for k ∈ {1, 2}. Averaging (11) over k ∈ {1, 2} we get
We now focus on lower bounding 2T − N
2 . We start by showing that N
2 is close to N
2 . The following lemma, which is the key lemma of both lower bound proofs, carries that out formally and states that the expected number of times an action is played by A does not change too much when we change the model, if the outcome distributions p 1 and p 2 are "close" in KL-divergence:
Lemma 18. For any partial-monitoring game with N actions and M outcomes, algorithm A, pair of outcome distributions p 1 ,p 2 ∈ ∆ M and action i, we have
where N
i under model p k , k = 1,2 with R being the set of revealing actions. 8 The proof is in the Appendix. We use Lemma 18 for i = 2 and that N (2) rev ≤ T to bound the difference N (2)
We upper bound D(p 2 p 1 ) using Lemma 16 with ε = v. The lemma implies that D(p 2 p 1 ) ≤ c 2 2 for < 0 with some 0 , c 2 > 0 which depend only on v and p. Putting this together with (13) we get
where c 3 = √ c 2 /2. Together with N
Substituting into (12) and choosing = 1/(2c 3 T 1/2 ) gives the desired lower bound
It seems from the proof that N (k) rev could be slightly sharpened to N
provided that our choice of ensures that < min(α, 0 ) =: 1 that depends only on L. This condition is satisfied for all T > T 0 = 1/(2c 3 1 ) 2 . Since c 1 , c 3 , and 1 depend only on L, for such T , R T (G) ≥ Remark Theorem 13 also holds if M = ∞. Namely, since the proof of c)⇒d) of Lemma 3 remains obviously valid, the non-triviality of the game (K ≥ 2) excludes that c) holds, and thus for each i ∈ N there is j i ∈ {1, 2, . . . } such that i, j i is not minimal in the j th i column of L. Then take the minor of L consisting of its (at most N) columns corresponding to O = { j 1 , . . . , j N }. For the corresponding finite game G O (that does not depend on A), Lemma 3 c) still does not hold, thus nor d) does, and G O is also non-trivial. Hence Theorem 13 implies that 9
Lower Bound for Hard Games
In this section, we present an Ω(T 2/3 ) lower bound for the expected regret of any two-outcome game in the case when the separation condition does not hold. Proof of Theorem 19. We follow the lower bound proof for the label efficient prediction from Cesa-Bianchi et al. [22] with a few changes. The most important change, as we will see, is the choice of the models we randomize over.
As the first step, the following lemma shows that non-revealing degenerate actions do not influence the minimax regret of a game.
Lemma 20. Let G be a non-degenerate game with two outcomes. Let G be the game we get by removing the degenerate non-revealing actions from G. Then R T (G) = R T (G ).
The proof of this lemma can be found in the Appendix. By the non-degeneracy condition and Lemma 20, we can assume without loss of generality that G does not have degenerate actions. We can also assume without loss of generality that actions 1 and 2 are the two consecutive non-dominated non-revealing actions. It follows by scaling and a reduction similar to the one we used in Section 5.1 that we can further assume ( 1,1 , 1,2 ) = (0, α), ( 2,1 , 2,2 ) = (1 − α, 0) with some α ∈ (0, 1). Using the non-degeneracy condition and that actions 1 and 2 are consecutive non-dominated actions, we get that for all i ≥ 3, there exists some λ i ∈ R depending only on L such that
9 The same reasoning can be used to show that we could assume without loss of generality M ≤ N in the proof of Theorem 13.
Let λ min = min i≥3 λ i , λ max = max i≥3 λ i , and λ * = λ max − λ min .
We define two models for generating outcomes from {1, 2}. In model 1, the outcome distribution is p 1 (1) = α+ , p 1 (2) = 1− p 1 (1), whereas in model 2, p 2 (1) = α− , p 2 (2) = 1− p 2 (1) with 0 < ≤ min(α, 1− α)/2 to be chosen later. We use randomization replacing the outcomes by a sequence J 1 , J 2 , . . . , J T of random variables i.i.d. according to p k , k ∈ {1, 2}, and independently of the internal randomization of A. Let N (k) i be the expected number of times action i is chosen by A under p k up to time step T , as in (8) . With subindex k, Pr k and E k denote probability and expectation given outcome model k ∈ {1, 2}, respectively. Finally, let N (k)
i . Note that, if < 0 with some 0 depending only on L then only actions 1 and 2 can be optimal for these models. Namely, action k is optimal under p k , henceR T (A, G) can be bounded in terms of N (k) i using Lemma 17:
for k = 1,2. Now, by (14) , there exists τ > 0 depending only on L such that for all i ≥ 3, i,1 ≥ (1 − λ i )(1 − α) + τ and i,2 ≥ αλ i + τ. These bounds and simple algebra give that
Analogously, we get
Note that if < τ/ max(|1 − λ max |, |λ min |) then both f 1 and f 2 are positive. Substituting these into (15) gives
The following lemma is an application of Lemma 18 and 16:
Lemma 21. There exists a constant c > 0 (depending on α only) such that
and N
≥3 .
Proof. We only prove the first inequality, the other one is symmetric. Using Lemma 18 with M = 2, i = 2 and the fact that actions 1 and 2 are non-revealing, we have
Lemma 16 with M = 2, p = (α, 1 − α) , and ε = ( , − ) gives D(p 2 p 1 ) ≤ĉ 2 , whereĉ depends only on α. Rearranging and substituting c = √ĉ /2 yields the first statement of the lemma.
≥3 . Now, for k l we can lower bound the regret using Lemma 21 for (16):
as f k > 0. For k = l we do this subtracting cT 2 N (l) ≥3 ≥ 0 from the right-hand side of (16) leading to the same lower bound, hence (17) holds for k = 1,2. Finally, averaging (17) over k ∈ {1, 2} we have the bound
where
≥3 and q(x) can be written and lower bounded as
independently of x whenever λ * c 2 < 2τ and c 2 ≤ 1. Now it is easy to see that if c 2 = min(τ/(c 2 + λ * ), 1) then these hold, moreover, q(x) ≥ c 2 /4 > 0 giving the desired lower bound
provided that our choice of ensures that < min(α/2, (1−α)/2, 0 , τ/|1−λ max |, τ/|λ min |) =: 1 that depends only on L. This condition is satisfied for all T > T 0 = (c 2 / 1 ) 3 . Since c 2 and 1 depend only on L, for such
. If the separation condition does not hold then the game is clearly non-trivial which, using Lemma 3 b) and d) as in the proof of Theorem 13, implies that R T (G) > 0 for T ≥ 1. Thus choosing
, C > 0 and for any T , R T (G) ≥ CT 2/3 .
Discussion
In this paper we classified non-degenerate partial-monitoring games with two outcomes based on their minimax regret. An immediate question is how the classification extends to degenerate games. Unfortunately, the degeneracy condition is needed in both the upper and lower bound proofs. We do not even know if all degenerate games fall into one of the four categories or there are some games with minimax regret of Θ(T α ) for some α ∈ (1/2, 2/3). Nonetheless, we conjecture that, if the revealing degenerate actions are included in the chain of non-dominated actions, the classification theorem holds without any change.
The most important open question is whether our results generalize to games with more outcomes. A simple observation is that, given a finite partial-monitoring game, if we restrict the opponent's choices to any two outcomes, the resulting game's hardness serves as a lower bound on the minimax regret of the original game. This gives us a sufficient condition that a game has Ω(T 2/3 ) minimax regret. We believe that the Ω(T 2/3 ) lower bound can also be generalized to situations where two " -close" outcome distributions are not distinguishable by playing only their respective optimal actions. Generalizing the upper bound result seems more challenging. The algorithm AppleTree heavily exploits the two-dimensional structure of the losses and, as of yet, in general we do not know how to construct an algorithm that achieves O( √ T ) regret on partial-monitoring games with more than two outcomes.
It is also important to note that our upper bound result heavily exploits the assumption that the opponent is oblivious. Our results do not extend to games with non-oblivious opponents, to the best of our knowledge.
Appendix A.
Proof of Lemma 3. a)⇒b) is obvious.
Observe that f (A) depends on A through only the distribution of I 1 on N denoted by q = q(A) now, that is, f (A) = f (q) for proper f . This dependence is continuous on the compact domain of q, hence the infimum can be replaced by minimum. Thus min q f (q) ≤ 0, that is, there exists a q such that for all j ∈ M, E I 1 , j = min i∈N i, j . This implies that the support of q contains only actions whose loss is not larger than the loss of any other action irrespectively of the choice of Nature's action. (Such an action is obviously non-dominated as shown by any p ∈ ∆ M supported on all outcomes.) c)⇒d) Action i in c) is non-dominated, and any other action with loss vector distinct from i is dominated (by i and any action with loss vector i ). 
Proof of Lemma 15. By Definition 1, action i is dominated if and only if
Proof of Lemma 17. Clearly, the worst-case expected regret of A is at least its average regret:
where the expectation on the right-hand side is taken with respect to both the random choices of the outcomes and the internal randomization of A. We lower bound the right-hand side switching expectation and minimum to get
(by the independence of I t and J t )
(A.1) follows from the fact that action k is optimal under p k . Clearly the term i = k can be omitted in the last equality.
Proof of Lemma 18. We only prove the first inequality, the other one is symmetric. Assume first that A is deterministic, that is, I t : Σ t−1 → N, and so I t (h 1:t−1 ) denotes the choice of the algorithm at time step t, given that the (random) history of observations of length t − Decompose this sum for the case I t (h 1:t−1 ) R and I t (h 1:t−1 ) ∈ R. In the first case, we play a none-revealing action, thus our observation H t = h I t (h 1:t−1 ),J t = h I t (h 1:t−1 ),1 is a deterministic constant in both models 1 and 2, thus both Pr 1 (· | H 1:t−1 = h 1:t−1 ) and Pr 2 (· | H 1:t−1 = h 1:t−1 ) are degenerate and the KL divergence factor is 0. Otherwise, playing a revealing action, H t = h I t (h 1:t−1 ),J t is the same deterministic function of J t (which is independent of H 1:t−1 ) in both models 1 and 2, and so the inner sum in (A. For any action i ∈ N, as in the proof of Lemma 14, consider the compact convex cell C i in ∆ M , whose union is ∆ M (see (4)). Let p 1 be any point in the interior of ∆ M . By (4), there is a cell C i 1 containing p 1 . If C i 1 = ∆ M held then action i 1 would satisfy Lemma 3 c), thus also d), and the game would be trivial. So there must be a point, say p 2 , in ∆ M \ C i 1 . The intersection of the closed segment p 1 p 2 and C i 1 is closed and convex, thus it is a closed subsegment p 1 p for some p ∈ C i 1 (p p 2 ). p 1 ∈ int ∆ M and the convexity of ∆ M imply p ∈ int ∆ M . Since the open segment pp 2 has to be covered by i :C i C i 1 C i , that is a closed set, p ∈ i:C i C i 1 C i must also hold, that is, p ∈ C i 2 for some C i 2 C i 1 (requiring i 1 i 2 ). Hence p satisfies both (a) and (b).
Proof of Theorem 13. When M = 1, G is always trivial, thus we assume that M ≥ 2. Without loss of generality we may assume that all the actions are all-revealing.
Let p ∈ ∆ M be a distribution of the outcomes that satisfies conditions (a) and (b) of Lemma 22. By renaming actions we can assume without loss of generality that 1 2 and actions 1 and 2 are optimal under p, that is, Here, in the last two expressions, the expectation is with respect to both the internal randomization of A and the random choice of J 1 , J 2 , . . . , J T . Now, since J t is independent of I t , we see that E[ I t ,J t | I t ] = I t , p . By (A.5), we have I t , p ≥ 1 , p = 2 , p . Therefore (upper bounding also the minimum), 
